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Abstract
The widely held belief that BQP strictly contains BPP raises fundamental questions: Upcoming generations of
quantum computers might already be too large to be simulated classically. Is it possible to experimentally test that these
systems perform as they should, if we cannot efficiently compute predictions for their behavior? Vazirani has asked
[Vaz07]: If computing predictions for Quantum Mechanics requires exponential resources, is Quantum Mechanics a
falsifiable theory? In cryptographic settings, an untrusted future company wants to sell a quantum computer or perform
a delegated quantum computation. Can the customer be convinced of correctness without the ability to compare results
to predictions?
To provide answers to these questions, we define Quantum Prover Interactive Proofs (QPIP). Whereas in standard
Interactive Proofs [GMR85] the prover is computationally unbounded, here our prover is in BQP, representing a
quantum computer. The verifier models our current computational capabilities: it is a BPP machine, with access
to few qubits. Our main theorem can be roughly stated as: ”Any language in BQP has a QPIP, and moreover, a
fault tolerant one”. We provide two proofs. The simpler one uses a new (possibly of independent interest) quantum
authentication scheme (QAS) based on random Clifford elements. This QPIP however, is not fault tolerant. Our
second protocol uses polynomial codes QAS due to Ben-Or, Cre´peau, Gottesman, Hassidim, and Smith [BOCG+06],
combined with quantum fault tolerance and secure multiparty quantum computation techniques. A slight modification
of our constructions makes the protocol “blind”: the quantum computation and input remain unknown to the prover.
After we have derived the results, we have learnt that Broadbent, Fitzsimons, and Kashefi [BFK08] have inde-
pendently derived ”universal blind quantum computation” using completely different methods (measurement based
quantum computation). Their construction implicitly implies similar implications.
∗School of Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. {doria,benor,elade}@cs.huji.ac.il
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
As far as we know today, the quantum mechanical description of many-particle systems requires exponential resources
to simulate. This has the following fundamental implication: the results of an experiment conducted on a many-particle
physical system described by quantum mechanics, cannot be predicted (in general) by classical computational devices,
in any reasonable amount of time. This important realization (or belief), which stands at the heart of the interest in
quantum computation, led Vazirani to ask [Vaz07]: Is quantum mechanics a falsifiable physical theory? Assuming that
small quantum systems obey quantum mechanics to an extremely high accuracy, it is still possible that the physical
description of large systems deviates significantly from quantum mechanics. Since there is no efficient way to make
the predictions of the experimental outcomes for most large quantum systems, there is no way to test or falsify this
possibility experimentally, using the usual scientific paradigm, as described by Popper.
This question has practical implications. Experimentalists who attempt to realize quantum computers would like
to know how to test that their systems indeed perform the way they should. But most tests cannot be compared to any
predictions! The tests whose predictions can in fact be computed, do not actually test the more interesting aspects of
quantum mechanics, namely those which cannot be simulated efficiently classically.
The problem arises in cryptographic situations as well. Consider for example, a company called Q-Wave which is
trying to convince a certain potential customer that the system it had managed to build is in fact a quantum computer
of 100 qubits. How can the customer, who cannot make predictions of the outcomes of the computations made by the
machine, test that the machine is indeed a quantum computer which does what it is claimed to do? Given the amounts
of grant money and prestige involved, the possibility of dishonesty of experimentalists and experimentalists’ bias inside
the academia should not be ignored either [Roo03, Wik08].
There is another related question that stems from cryptography. It is natural to expect that the first generations
of quantum computers will be extremely expensive, and thus quantum computations would be delegated to untrusted
companies. Is there any way for the costumer to trust the outcome, without the need to trust the company which
performed the computation, even though the costumer cannot verify the outcome of the computation (since he cannot
simulate it)? And even if the company is honest, can the costumer detect innocent errors in such a computation?
Vazirani points out [Vaz07] that in fact, an answer to these questions is already given in the form of Shor’s
algorithm. Indeed, quantum mechanics does not seem to be falsifiable using the usual scientific paradigm, assuming
that BQP is strictly lager than BPP. However, Shor’s algorithm does provide a way for falsification, by means of an
experiment which lies outside of the scientific paradigm: though its result cannot be predicted and then compared to the
experimental outcome, it can be verified once the outcome of the experiment is known (by simply taking the product of
the factors and checking that this gives the input integer).
This, however, does not fully address the issues raised above. Let us take for example the case of the company trying
to convince a costumer that the system it is trying to sell is indeed a quantum computer of 100 qubits. Such a system
is already too big to simulate classically; However, any factoring algorithm that is run on a system of a 100 qubits can
be easily performed by today’s classical technology. For delegated quantum computations, how can Shor’s algorithm
help in convincing a costumer of correctness of, say, the computation of the BQP complete problem of approximating
the Jones polynomial [AJL06, AA06]? As for experimental results, it is difficult to rigorously state what is exactly
falsified or verified by the possibility to apply Shor’s algorithm. Finally, from a fundamental point of view, there is a
fundamental difference between being convinced of the ability to factor, and testing universal quantum evolution.
We thus pose the following main question: Can one be convinced of the correctness of the computation of any
polynomial quantum circuit? Does a similar statement to the one above, regarding Shor’s algorithm, apply for universal
quantum computation? Alternatively, can one be convinced of the “correctness” of the quantum mechanical description
of any quantum experiment that can be conducted in the laboratory, even though one cannot compute any predictions
for the outcomes of this experiment? In this paper we address the above fundamental question in a rigorous way. We do
this by taking a computational point of view on the interaction between the supposed quantum computer, and the entity
which attempts to verify that it indeed computes what it should.
1.2 Quantum Prover Interactive Proofs (QPIP)
Interactive proof systems, defined by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR85], play a crucial role in the theory of
computer science. Roughly, a languageL is said to have an interactive proof if there exists a computationally unbounded
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prover (denotedP) and a BPP verifier (V) such that for any x ∈ L, P convincesV of the fact that x ∈ Lwith probability
≥ 23 (completeness). Otherwise, when x /∈ L any prover fails to convince V with probability higher than 13 (soundness).
Shor’s factoring algorithm [Sho97] can be viewed as an interactive proof of a very different kind: one between a
classical BPP verifier, and a quantum polynomial time (BQP) prover, in which the prover convinces the verifier of the
factors of a given number (this can be easily converted to the usual IP formalism of membership in a language). This is
a quantum interactive proof of a very different kind than quantum interactive proofs previously studied in the literature
[Wat03], in which the prover is an unbounded quantum computer, and the verifier is a BQP machine.
Clearly, such an interactive proof between a BQP prover and a BPP verifier exists for any problem inside NP∩
BQP. However, it is widely believed that BQP is not contained in NP ( and in fact not even in the polynomial hierarchy).
The main idea of the paper is to generalize the above interactive point of view of Shor’s’s algorithm, and show that with
this generalization, a verifier can be convinced of the result of any polynomial quantum circuit, using interaction with
the prover - the quantum computer.
To this end we define a new model of quantum interactive proofs which we call quantum prover interactive proofs
(QPIP). The simplest definition would be an interactive proof in which the prover is a BQP machine and the verifier
a BPP classical machine. In some sense, this model captures the possible interaction between the quantum world (for
instance, quantum systems in the lab) and the classical world. However, this model does not suffice for our purposes.
We therefore modify it a little, and allow the verifier additional access to a constant number of qubits. The verifier can
be viewed as modeling our current computational abilities, and so in some sense, the verifier in the following system
represents “us”.
Definition 1.1 Quantum Prover Interactive Proof (QPIP) is an interactive proof system with the following properties:
• The prover is computationally restricted to BQP.
• The verifier is a hybrid quantum-classical machine. Its classical part is a BPP machine. The quantum part is a
register of c qubits (for some constant c), on which the prover can perform arbitrary quantum operations. At any
given time, the verifier is not allowed to possess more than c qubits. The interaction between the quantum and
classical parts is the usual one: the classical part controls which operations are to be performed on the quantum
register, and outcomes of measurements of the quantum register can be used as input to the classical machine.
• There are two communication channels: one quantum and one classical.
The completeness and soundness conditions are identical to the IP conditions.
Abusing notation, we denote the class of languages for which such a proof exists also by QPIP.
1.3 Main Results
Definition 1.2 The promise problem Q-CIRCUIT consists of a quantum circuit made of a sequence of gates, U =
UT . . .U1, acting on n input bits. The task is to distinguish between two cases:
Q-CIRCUITYES : ‖((|0〉 〈0| ⊗ In−1)U |0¯〉 ‖2 ≥ 23
Q-CIRCUITNO : ‖((|0〉 〈0| ⊗ In−1)U |0¯〉 ‖2 ≤ 13
Q-CIRCUIT is a BQP complete problem, and moreover, this remains true for other soundness and completeness
parameters 0 < s, c < 1, if c− s > 1Poly(n) . Our main result is:
Theorem 1.1 The language Q-CIRCUIT has a QPIP.
Since Q-CIRCUIT is BQP complete, and QPIP is trivially inside BQP, we have:
Theorem 1.2 BQP = QPIP.
Thus, a BQP the prover can convince the verifier of any language he can compute. We remark that our definition of
QPIP is asymmetric - the verifier is “convinced” only if the quantum circuit outputs 1. This asymmetry seems irrelevant
in our context of verifying correctness of quantum computations. Indeed, it is possible to define a symmetric version of
QPIP, (we denote it by QPIPsym) in which the verifier is convinced of correctness of the prover’s outcome (in both 0
and 1 cases) rather than of membership of the input in the language, namely in the 1 case only. That BQP = QPIPsym
follows quite easily from the fact that BQP is closed under complement (see Appendix H).
Moreover, the above results apply in a realistic setting, namely with noise:
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Theorem 1.3 Theorem 1.1 holds also when the quantum communication and computation devices are subjected to the
usual local noise model assumed in quantum fault tolerance settings.
In the works [Chi01, AS06] a related question was raised: in our cryptographic setting, if we distrust the company
performing the delegated quantum computation, we might want to keep both the input and the function which is being
computed secret. Can this be done while maintaining the confidence in the outcome? A simple modification of our
protocols gives
Theorem 1.4 Theorem 1.3 holds also in a blind setting, namely, the prover does not get any information regarding the
function being computed and its input.
We note that an analogous result for NP-hard problems was shown already in the late 80’s to be impossible unless
the polynomial hierarchy collapses [AFK87].
1.4 Proofs Overview (and More Results About Quantum Authentication Schemes)
Our main tool is quantum authentication schemes (QAS) [BCG+02]. Roughly, a QAS allows two parties to communi-
cate in the following way: Alice sends an encoded quantum state to Bob. The scheme is secure if upon decoding, Bob
gets the same state as Alice had sent unless it was altered, whereas if the state had been altered, then Bob’s chances of
declaring valid a wrong state are small. The basic idea is that similar security can be achieved, even if the state needs
to be rotated by unitary gates, as long as the verifier can control how the unitary gates affect the authenticated states.
Implementing this simple idea in the context of fault tolerance encounters several complications, which we explain later.
We start with a simple QAS and QPIP, which we do not know how to make fault tolerant, but which demonstrates
some of the ideas and might be of interest on its own due to its simplicity.
Clifford QAS based QPIP. We present a new, simple and efficient QAS, based on random Clifford group operations
(it is reminiscent of Clifford based quantum t-designs [AE07, ABW08]). To encode a state of m qubits, tensor the state
with d qubits in the state |0〉, and apply a random Clifford operator on the m+d qubits. The security proof of this QAS
uses a combination of known ideas. We first prove that any attack of Eve is mapped by the random Clifford operator to
random Pauli operators. We then show that those are detected with high probability. This QAS might be interesting on
its own right due to its simplicity.
To construct a QPIP using this QAS, we simply use the prover as an untrusted storage device: the verifier asks
the prover for the authenticated qubits on which he would like to apply the next gate, decodes them, applies the gate,
encodes them back and sends them to the prover. The proof of security is quite straight forward given the security of
the QAS.
Due to the lack of structure of the authenticated states, we do not know how to make the prover apply gates on
the states without revealing the key. This seems to be necessary for fault tolerance. The resulting QPIP protocol also
requires many rounds of quantum communication.
Polynomial codes based QAS and its QPIP Our second type of QPIP uses a QAS due to Ben-Or, Cre´peau,
Gottesman, Hassidim and Smith [BOCG+06]. This QAS is based on signed quantum polynomial codes, which are
quantum polynomial codes [ABO97] of degree at most d multiplied by some random sign (1 or−1) at every coordinate
(this is called the sign key) and a random Pauli at every coordinate (the pauli key).
We present here a security proof which was missing from the original paper [BOCG+06]. The proof requires some
care, due to a subtle point, which was not addressed in [BOCG+06]. We first prove that no Pauli attack can fool more
than a small fraction of the sign keys, and thus the sign key suffices in order to protect the code from any Pauli attack.
Next, we need to show that the scheme is secure against general attacks. This, surprisingly, does not follow by linearity
from the security against pauli attacks (as is the case in quantum error correcting codes): if we omit the Pauli key we get
an authentication scheme which is secure against Pauli attacks but not against general attacks. We proceed by showing,
(with some similarity to the Clifford based QAS), that the random Pauli key effectively translates Eve’s attack to a
mixture (not necessarily uniform like in the Clifford case) of Pauli operators acting on a state encoded by a random
signed polynomial code.
Due to its algebraic structure, the signed polynomial code QAS allows applying gates without knowing the key.
This was used in [BOCG+06] for secure multiparty quantum computation; here we use it to allow the prover to perform
gates without knowing the authentication key.
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The QPIP protocol goes as follows. The prover receives all authenticated qubits in the beginning. Those include the
inputs to the circuit, as well as authenticated magic states required to perform Toffoli gates, as described in [BOCG+06,
NCG00]. With those at hand, the prover can perform universal computation using only Clifford group operations
and measurements (universality was proved for qubits in [BK05], and the extension to higher dimensions was used in
[BOCG+06]). The prover sends the verifier results of measurements and the verifier sends information given those
results, which enables the prover to continue the computation. The communication is thus classical except for the first
round.
Fault Tolerance Using the polynomial codes QAS enables applying known fault tolerance techniques based on
polynomial quantum codes [ABO97, BOCG+06] to achieve robustness to local noise. However, a problem arises
when attempting to apply those directly: in such a scheme, the verifier needs to send the prover polynomially many
authenticated qubits every time step, so that the prover can perform error corrections on all qubits simultaneously.
However, the verifier’s quantum register contains only a constant number of qubits, and so the rate at which he can send
authenticated qubits (a constant number at every time step) seems to cause a bottleneck in this approach.
We bypass this problem is as follows. At the first stage of the protocol, authenticated qubits are sent from the
verifier to the prover, one by one. As soon as the prover receives an authenticated qubit, he protects his qubits
using his own concatenated error correcting codes so that the effective error in the encoded authenticated qubit is
constant. This constant accuracy can be maintained for a long time by the prover, by performing error correction with
respect to his error correcting code. Thus, polynomially many such authenticated states can be passed to the prover in
sequence. A constant effective error is not good enough, but can be amplified to an arbitrary inverse polynomial by
purification. Indeed, the prover cannot perform purification on his own since the purification compares authenticated
qubits and the prover does not know the authentication code; However, the verifier can help in the prover’s using
classical communication. This way the prover can reduce the effective error on his encoded authenticated qubits to
inverse polynomial, and perform the usual fault tolerant construction of the given circuit, with the help of the prover in
performing the gates.
Blind Quantum Computation To achieve Theorem 1.4, we modify our construction so that the circuit that the prover
performs is a universal quantum circuit, i.e., a fixed sequence of gates which gets as input a description of a quantum
circuit, plus an input string to that circuit, and applies the input quantum circuit to the input string. Since the universal
quantum circuit is fixed, it reveals nothing about the input quantum circuit or the input string to it.
1.5 Interpretations of the Results
The corollaries below clarify the connection between the results and the motivating questions, and show that one can
use the QPIP protocols designed here, to address the various issues raised in Sec. 1.1.
We start with some basic question. Conditioned that the verifier does not abort, does he know that the final state of
the machine is very close to the correct state that was supposed to be the outcome of the computation? This unfortunately
is not the case. It may be that the prover can make sure that the verifier abort with very high probability, but when he
does not abort, the computation is wrong. However a weaker form of the above result holds: if we know that the
probability of not to abort is high, then we can deduce something about correctness.
Corollary 1.5 For a QPIP protocol with security parameter δ, if the verifier does not abort with probability ≥ γ then
the trace distance between the final density matrix and that of the correct state is at most 2δγ
The proof is simple and is given in Appendix G.
Further interpreting Theorem 1.2, we show that under a somewhat stronger assumption than BQP 6= BPP, but still a
widely believed assumption, it is possible to lower bound the computational power of a successful prover and show that
it is not within BPP. Assuming that there is a language L ∈ BQP and there is a polynomial time samplable distribution
D on which any BPP machine errs with non negligible probability (e.g. the standard cryptographic assumptions about
the hardness of Factoring or Discrete Log), we have
Corollary 1.6 For such a language L, if the verifier interacts with a given prover for the language L, and does not
abort with high probability, then the prover’s computational power cannot be simulated by a BPP machine.
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This corollary follows immediately from Corollary 1.5.
One might wonder whether it is possible to somehow get convinced not only of the fact that the computation that
was performed by the prover is indeed the desired one, but also that the prover must have had access to some quantum
computer. We prove:
Corollary 1.7 There exists a language L ∈ BQP such that even if the prover in our QPIP is replaced by one with
unbounded classical computational power, but only a constant number of qubits, the prover will not be able to convince
the verifier to accept: V in this case aborts the computation with high probability.
This means that our protocols suggests yet another example in which quantum mechanics cannot be simulated by
classical systems, regardless of how computationally powerful they are. This property appears already in bounded
storage models [Wat99], and of course (in a different setting) in the EPR experiment.
Finally, we remark that in the study of the classical notion of IP, a natural question is to ask how powerful the prover
must be, to prove certain classes of languages. It is known that a PSPACE prover is capable of proving any language in
PSPACE, and similarly, it is known that NP or #P restricted provers can prove any language which they can compute.
This is not known for coNP, SZK or PH [AB]. It is natural to ask what is the power of a BQP prover; our results imply
that such a prover can prove the entire class of BQP (albeit to a verifier who is not entirely classical). Thus, we provide
a characterization of the power of a BQP prover.
1.6 Related Work and Open Questions
The two questions regarding the cryptographic angle were asked by Childs in [Chi01], and by Arrighi and Salvail in
[AS06], who proposed schemes to deal with such scenarios. However [Chi01] do not deal with a cheating prover, and
[AS06] deals with a restricted set of functions that are classically verifiable.
After deriving the results of this work, we have learned that Broadbent, Fitzsimons, and Kashefi [BFK08] have
proven related results. Using measurement based quantum computation, they construct a protocol for universal blind
quantum computation. In their case, it suffices that the verifier’s register consists of a single qubit. Their results imply
similar implications to ours, though these are implicit in [BFK08].
An important and intriguing open question is whether it is possible to remove the necessity for even a small quantum
register, and achieve similar results in the more natural QPIP model in which the verifier is entirely classical. This would
have interesting fundamental implications regarding the ability of a classical system to learn and test a quantum system.
Another interesting (perhaps related?) open question is to study the model we have presented here of QPIP,
with more than one prover. Possibly, multiprover QPIP might be strong enough even when restricted to classical
communication.
This work also raises some questions in the philosophy of science. In particular, it suggests the possibility of
formalizing, based on computational complexity notions, the interaction between physicists and Nature; perhaps the
evolution of physical theories.. Following discussions with us at preliminary stages of this work, Jonathan Yaari is
currently studying “interactive proofs with Nature” from the philosophy of science aspect [Yaa08].
Paper Organization We start by some notations and background in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3 we present both our QAS and
prove their security. In Sec. 4 we present our QPIP protocols together some aspects of their security proofs. Other
proofs are delayed to the appendices due to lack of space: Fault tolerance is explained in Appendix E. Blind delegated
quantum computation is proved in Appendix F. The corollaries related to the interpretations of the results are proven in
Appendix G.
2 Background
2.1 Pauli and Clifford Group
Let Pn denote the n-qubits Pauli group. P = P1 ⊗ P2⊗. . .⊗Pn were Pi ∈ {I, X, Y, Z}.
Definition 2.1 Generalized Pauli operator over Fq: X |a〉 = |(a+ 1) mod q〉 , Z |a〉 = ωaq |a〉 , Y = XZ, where
ωq = e
2πi/q is the primitive q-root of the unity.
We note that ZX = ωqXZ . We use the same notation, Pn, for the standard and generalized Pauli groups, as it will be
clear by context which one is being used.
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Definition 2.2 For vectors x, z in Fmq , we denote a Px,z the Pauli operator Zz1Xx1⊗. . .⊗ZzmXxm .
We denote the set of all unitary matrices over a vector space A as U(A). The Pauli group Pn is a basis to the
matrices acting on n-qubits. In particular, we can write any matrix U ∈ U(A ⊗ B) for A the space of n qubits, as∑
P∈Pn
P ⊗ UP with UP some matrix on B.
Let Cn denote the n-qubit Clifford group. Recall that it is a finite subgroup of U(2n) generated by the Hadamard
matrix-H, by K =
(
1 0
0 i
)
, and by controlled-NOT. The Clifford group is characterized by the property that it maps
the Pauli groupPn to itself, up to a phase α ∈ {±1,±i}. That is: ∀C ∈ Cn, P ∈ Pn : αCPC† ∈ Pn
Fact 2.1 A random element from the Clifford group on n qubits can be sampled efficiently by choosing a string k of
poly(n) length uniformly at random. The map from k to the group element represented as a product of Clifford group
generators can be computed in classical polynomial time.
2.2 Signed Polynomial Codes
For background on polynomial quantum codes see Appendix A.
Definition 2.3 ([BOCG+06]) The signed polynomial code with respect to a string k ∈ {±1}m (denoted Ck) is defined
by: ∣∣Ska〉 def= 1√
qd
∑
f :def(f)≤d,f(0)=a
|k1 · f(α1). . .km · f(αm)〉 (1)
We use m = 2d + 1. In this case, the code can detect d errors. Also, Ck is self dual [BOCG+06], namely, the code
subspace is equal to the dual code subspace.
3 Quantum Authentication
3.1 Definitions
Definition 3.1 (adapted from Barnum et. al. [BCG+02]). A quantum authentication scheme (QAS) is a pair of
polynomial time quantum algorithms A and B together with a set of classical keys K such that:
• A takes as input an m-qubit message system M and a key k ∈ K and outputs a transmitted system T of m + d
qubits.
• B takes as input the (possibly altered) transmitted system T ′ and a classical key k ∈ K and outputs two systems: a
m-qubit message stateM , and a single qubit V which indicate whether the state is considered valid or erroneous.
The basis states of V are called |V AL〉 , |ABR〉. For a fixed k we denote the corresponding super-operators by
Ak and Bk.
Given a pure state |ψ〉, consider the following test on the joint system M,V : output a 1 if the first m qubits are in
state |ψ〉 or if the last qubit is in state |ABR〉, otherwise, output 0. The corresponding projections are:
P
|ψ〉
1 = |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ IV + (IM − |ψ〉 〈ψ|)⊗ |ABR〉 〈ABR| (2)
P
|ψ〉
0 = (IM − |ψ〉 〈ψ|)⊗ |V AL〉 〈V AL| (3)
The scheme is secure if for all possible input states |ψ〉 and for all possible interventions by the adversary, the expected
fidelity of B’s output to the space defined by P |ψ〉1 is high:
Definition 3.2 A QAS is secure with error ǫ if for every state |ψ〉 it holds:
• Completeness: For all keys k ∈ K : Bk(Ak(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)) = |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |V AL〉 〈V AL|
• Soundness: For any super-operatorO (representing a possible intervention by the adversary), if ρB is defined by
defined by ρB = 1|K|
∑
k Bk
(O(Ak(|ψ〉 〈ψ|))), then: Tr(P |ψ〉1 ρB) ≥ 1− ǫ.
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3.2 Clifford Authentication Scheme
Protocol 3.1 Clifford based QAS : Given is a state |ψ〉 on m qubits and d ∈ N a security parameter. We denote
n = m+ d. The set of keys K consists of succinct descriptions of Clifford operations on n qubits (following Fact 2.1).
We denote by C = Ck the operator specified by a key k ∈ K.
• Encoding - Ak: Alice applies Ck on the state |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉⊗d.
• Decoding - Bk: Bob applies C†k to the received state. Bob measures the auxiliary registers and declares the state
valid if they are all 0, otherwise Bob aborts.
Theorem 3.1 The Clifford scheme applied to n = m+ d qubits is a QAS with security 2−d. Where d is the number of
qubits added to a message on m qubits.
Proof: Sketch.(The full proof is given in Appendix B.1). We show that when Eve applies a non trivial Pauli operator,
then averaging over the random Clifford operators, the effective transformation on the original state is as an application
of a random Pauli. Hence, any Pauli attack is detected with high probability. We then show that any attack of Eve is
reduced to a very specific form:
Ms : ρ→ sρ+ (1− s) 1
4n − 1
∑
P 6=I
PρP † (4)
(for some 0 ≤ s ≤ 1). It is not hard to see, using linearity, that this type of attack is detected with high probability. 
Given r blocks of m qubits each, we can apply the QAS separately on each one of the r blocks. B declares the state
valid if all of the r registers are valid according to the original Clifford QAS . We call this the concatenated Clifford
protocol. The completeness of the concatenated protocol is trivial, reasoning as in the original QAS. For soundness we
have the following theorem, whose proof is given in Appendix B.2.
Theorem 3.2 The concatenated Clifford protocol has the security of the individual Clifford with security parameter d,
QAS, that is 2−d. This holds regardless of the number of blocks (r) that are authenticated.
3.3 Polynomial Authentication Scheme
Protocol 3.2 Polynomial Authentication protocol : Alice wishes to send the state |ψ〉 of dimension q. She chooses a
security parameter d, and a code length m = 2d+ 1.
• Encoding: Alice randomly selects a pair of keys: a sign key k ∈ {±1}m and a Pauli key (x, z) with x, z ∈ Fqm.
She encodes |ψ〉 using the signed quantum polynomial code Ck of polynomial degree d (see Definition 2.3). She
then applies the Pauli P(x,z) (i.e., for j ∈ {1, ..,m} she applies ZzjXxj on the j’th qubit).
• Decoding Bob applies the inverse of P(x,z), and performs the error detection procedure of the code Ck. He aborts
if any error is found and declares the message valid otherwise.
The completeness of this protocol is trivial. We proceed to prove the security of the protocol.
Theorem 3.3 The polynomial authentication scheme is secure against general attacks with security 2−d
Proof: A sketch was given in the introduction; the full proof is given in Appendix C.1. 
We notice that in this scheme a q-dimensional system is encoded into a system of dimension qm = q2d+1. The same
security is achieved in the Clifford QAS by encoding q into q · 2d dimensions. The polynomial scheme is somewhat
worse in parameters, but still with an exponentially good security.
To encode several registers, one can independently authenticate each register as in the Clifford case, (Theorem 3.2)
but in fact we can use the same sign key k for all registers, while still maintaining security. This fact will be extremely
useful in Sec. 4. The following theorem is proved in Appendix C.2.
Theorem 3.4 The concatenated polynomial based QAS (with the same sign key for all registers), and with degree d
polynomial, has the same security as the individual QAS, that is: 2−d.
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4 Interactive Proof For Quantumness
4.1 Clifford Authentication Based Protocol
Protocol 4.1 Clifford based Interactive Proof for Q-CIRCUIT: Fix a security parameter ǫ. Given is a quantum circuit
consisting of two-qubit gates, U = UT . . .U1, with error probability reduced to ≤ δ. The verifier authenticates the input
qubits of the circuit one by one using the (concatenated) Clifford QAS with security parameter d = ⌈log 1ǫ ⌉, that is
every qubit is authenticated by d+ 1 qubits, and sends them to P . For each i = 1 to m, the verifier asks the prover for
the authenticated qubits on which he would like to apply the gate Ui, decodes them, aborts if any error is found, applies
the gate, authenticates the resulting qubits using a new pair of authentication keys, and sends the encoded qubits back
to P . Finally, the verifier asks P to send the output authenticated qubit, decodes and aborts if any error is found;
otherwise, measures the decoded qubit and accepts or rejects accordingly. In any case that V does not get the correct
number of qubits he aborts.
Theorem 1.1 For any ǫ, δ > 0 Protocol 4.1 is a QPIP protocol with completeness 1 − δ and soundness δ + ǫ for
Q-CIRCUIT.
Proof: If the prover is honest, the verifier will declare valid with certainty. Since the error in the circuit is ≤ δ, (1− δ)
completeness follows. For soundness, we observe that for the verifier to accept if x is not in the language, means that
he has not aborted, and also, answers YES. Let us denote by Pbad the projection on this subspace (Valid on the first
qubit, Accept on the second). To bound the probability of this event, we observe that the correct state at any given step
is a state which is authenticated by the concatenated Clifford QAS. We can thus use the decomposition of Eve’s attacks
to Paulis, namely Eq. 33. Observing that a Pauli attack in our scheme is either declared valid or leads to abort, implies
that the final density matrix can be written as
ρfinal = (α0ρ0 + αcρc)⊗ |V AL〉 〈V AL|+ α1ρ¯1 ⊗ |ABR〉 〈ABR| , (5)
where ρc is the correct state. To bound Tr(Pbadρfinal) we observe that the left term in bounded by the security parameter
of the QAS, namely ǫ, the second term is bounded by the error caused by the quantum circuit, namely δ, and the third
term vanishes. 
The classical communication is linear in the number of gates. For ǫ = 12 , we get d = 1, and so the verifier uses a
register of 4 qubits. In fact 3 is enough, since each of the authenticated qubits can be decoded (or encoded and sent) on
its own before a new authenticated qubit is handled.
4.2 Polynomial Authentication Based Protocol
We start by describing how the prover performs a set of universal gates on authenticated qubits, using classical
communication with the verifier, and special states called Toffoli states. This set of operations, namely Clifford group
operations augmented with the Toffoli gate, form a universal set of gates [BOCG+06].
Application of Quantum Gates We denote encoded gates (logical operators) with a tilde. For the full description of
how to apply each of these logical gates see Appendix D.1. Briefly, for Pauli operators, the verifier merely updates
his Pauli key. For the control-SUM, and the Fourier transform, the prover applies the gates transversally as if the code
was the standard polynomial codes, and the verifier updates his sign and Pauli keys. For the measurement, the prover
measures the register, sends the result to the verifier, who returns its interpretation which he computes using his keys.
The Toffoli gate is applied using the above, on the relevant authenticated qubits plus an authenticated Toffoli state
[BOCG+06].
Protocol 4.2 Polynomial based Interactive Proof for Q-CIRCUIT Fix a security parameter ǫ. Given is a quantum
circuit on n qubits consisting gates from the above universal set, U = UT . . .U1. We assume the circuit has error
probability ≤ δ. The verifier sets d = ⌈log 1ǫ ⌉ and uses 3 registers of m = 2d + 1 qudits each, where each qudit is of
dimensionality q > m. The verifier uses concatenated polynomial QAS with security parameter d to authenticate n
input qudits and the necessary number of Toffoli states. This is done sequentially using 3m qudits at a time. Then, the
prover and verifier perform the gates of the circuit as described above. Finally, if the final measurement does not yield
an authenticated answer, the verifieraborts, otherwise, he accepts or rejects according to the measurement outcome.
Theorem 4.1 Protocol 4.2 is a QPIP protocol with completeness 1− δ and soundness δ + ǫ for Q-CIRCUIT.
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This theorem implies a second proof for Theorem 1.1. The size of the verifier’s register is naively 3m, but using the
same idea as in the Clifford case, m+ 2 suffice. With ǫ = 1/2, this gives a register of 5 qutrits.
Proof: (Sketch. The full proof can be found in Appendix D.2) The completeness is trivial, similarly to the Clifford case.
To prove the soundness of the protocol we first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2 At any stage of the protocol the verifier’s set of keys, k and {(x, z)i}n1 are distributed uniformly and
independently.
This implies that the correct state in an encoded states according to the concatenated QAS. The rest of the argument
follows closely that of the proof of Theorem 1.1. 
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A Polynomial Quantum Error Correction Codes
Definition A.1 Polynomial error correction code [ABO97]. Given m, d, q and {αi}m where αi are distinct non zero
values from Fq , the encoding of a ∈ Fq is |Sa〉
|Sa〉 def= 1√
qd
∑
f :def(f)≤d,f(0)=a
|f(α1), . . ., f(αm)〉 (6)
We use here m = 2d+ 1, in which case the code subspace is its own dual. It is easy to see that this code can detect
up to d errors [ABO97]. It will be useful to explicitly state the logical gates of SUM, Fourier (F ) and Pauli operators
(X,Z). We will see that it is possible to apply the logical operations of the Pauli operators or the controlled-sum by a
simple transitive operation. We can easily verify that applying X⊗m is the logical X˜ operation:
X˜ |Sa〉 =X⊗m 1√
qd
∑
f :def(f)≤d,f(0)=a
|f(α1), . . ., f(αm)〉
=
1√
qd
∑
f :def(f)≤d,f(0)=a
|f(α1) + 1, . . ., f(αm) + 1〉
(7)
setting f ′(α) = f(α) + 1
. . . =
1√
qd
∑
f ′:deg(f ′)≤d,f ′(0)=a+1
|f ′(α1), . . ., f ′(αm)〉
=
∣∣S(a+1)〉
(8)
Similarly for logical SUM , we consider the transitive application of controlled-sum, that is a SUM operations applied
between the j’th register of |Sa〉 and |Sb〉.
S˜UM |Sa〉 |Sb〉 = (SUM)⊗m 1
qd
∑
f(0)=a
|f(α1), . . ., f(αm)〉
∑
h(0)=b
|h(α1), . . ., h(αm)〉
=
1
qd
∑
f(0)=a,h(0)=b
|f(α1), . . ., f(αm)〉 |h(α1) + f(α1), . . ., h(αm) + f(αm)〉
(9)
We set g(α) = f(α) + h(α)
. . . =
1
qd
∑
f(0)=a,g(0)=a+b
|f(α1), . . ., f(αm)〉 |g(α1), . . ., g(αm)〉
= |Sa〉 |Sa+b〉
(10)
Showing what is the logical Fourier transform on the polynomial code requires more work. We first recall the
definition of the Fourier transform in Fq:
F |a〉 def= 1√
q
∑
b
ωabq |b〉 (11)
We consider an r-variant of the Fourier transform which we denote Fr
Fr |a〉 def= 1√
q
∑
b
ωrabq |b〉 (12)
In addition we need the following claim:
Lemma A.1 For any m distinct numbers {αi}m1 there exists {ci}m1 such that
m∑
i=1
cif(αi) = f(0) (13)
For any polynomial of degree ≤ m− 1.
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Proof: A polynomial p of degree≤ m−1 is completely determined by it’s values in the points αi. We write p as in the
form of the Lagrange interpolation polynomial: f(x) =
∑
i
∏
j 6=i
x−αj
αi−αj
f(αj). Therefore, we set ci =
∏
j 6=i
−αj
αi−αj
and notice that it is independent of p, and the claim follows. 
We are now ready to define the logical Fourier transform.
Claim A.2 The logical Fourier operator F˜ obeys the following identity:
F˜ |Sa〉 def= Fc1 ⊗ Fc2⊗. . .⊗Fcm |Sa〉 = q−m/2
∑
b ω
ab
q
∣∣∣S˜b〉 (14)
Where S˜b is the encoding of b in a polynomial code of degree m− d on m registers.
Proof of Claim A.2: We denote
∣∣f¯〉 = |f(α1), . . ., f(αm)〉
Fc1 ⊗ Fc2 . . .⊗ Fcm |Sa〉 = q−d/2Fc1 ⊗ Fc2⊗. . .⊗Fcm
∑
f :def(f)≤d,f(0)=a
|p¯〉 (15)
= q−d/2q−m/2
∑
f :def(f)≤d,f(0)=a
∑
b1,...,bm
ω
∑
i cif(αi)bi
q |b1, . . ., bm〉 (16)
We think of the bi’s as defining a polynomial g of degree ≤ m − 1 that is g(αi) = bi and split the sum according to
g(0):
. . . = q−(m+d)/2
∑
f :def(f)≤d,f(0)=a
∑
b
∑
g:deg(g)≤m−1,g(0)=b
ω
∑
i cif(αi)g(αi)
q |g¯〉 (17)
We temporally restrict our view to polynomials g with degree at most m− d − 1 and therefore the polynomial fg
has degree at most m− 1. We use Lemma A.1 on fg:
m∑
i=1
ci(fg)(αi) = fg(0) = ab (18)
Going back to Eq. 17:
q−(m+d)/2
∑
p,g
∑
b∈Fq
ω
∑
i ci(fg)(αi)
q |g¯〉 = q−(m+d)/2
∑
b∈Fq
∑
f,g
ωabq |g¯〉 (19)
Where the summation is over all f, g such that f(0) = a and g(0) = b while the degrees of f and g are at most d and
m− d− 1 respectively.
The sum does not depend on f and there are exactly qd polynomials f in the sum, therefore, we can write the
expression as :
. . . = q−(m+d)/2
∑
b∈Fq
qd
∑
g
ωabq |g¯〉
=
1√
q
∑
b∈Fq
ωabq
1√
qm−d−1
∑
g:deg(g)≤m−d−1,g(0)=b
|g¯〉
=
1√
q
∑
b∈Fq
ωabq
∣∣∣S˜b〉
(20)
Since the above expression has norm 1, if follows that the coefficients that we temporally ignored at Eq. 17 all vanish.

Corollary A.3 If m = 2d+ 1 then it follows from Claim A.2 that the code is self dual.
Claim A.4 The logical Pauli Z operator Z˜ is Zc1⊗. . .⊗Zcm .
The proof of this claim is omitted since it is extremely similar to the proof of Claim A.2.
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B Clifford Authentication Scheme
B.1 Security Proof of Clifford QAS
Proof of Theorem 3.1: We denote the space of the message sent from Alice to Bob asM . Without loss of generality,
we can assume that Eve adds to the message a system E (of arbitrary dimension) and performs a unitary transformation
U ∈ U(M ⊗ E) on the joint system. We note that there is a unique representation of U =∑P∈Pn P ⊗ UP since the
Pauli matrices form a basis for the 2n× 2n matrix vector space. We first characterize the effect that Eve’s attack has on
the unencoded message: |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉⊗d.
Claim B.1 Let ρ = |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉⊗d be the state of Alice before the application of the Clifford operator. For any attack
U =
∑
P P ⊗ UP by Eve, Bob’s state after decoding is Ms(ρ), where s = Tr(U †IUI).
We proceed with the proof of the theorem. From the above claim we know what Bob’s state after Eve’s intervention
is and we would like to bound its projection on P |ψ〉1 :
Tr
(
P
|ψ〉
1
(
sρ+
1− s
4n − 1
∑
Q∈Pn\{I}
QρQ†
))
= sTr(P |ψ〉1 ρ) +
1− s
4n − 1
∑
Q∈Pn\{I}
Tr(P |ψ〉1 QρQ
†) (21)
By definition of P |ψ〉1 we see that Tr(P
|ψ〉
1 ρ) = 1. On the other hand: Tr(P
|ψ〉
1 QρQ
†) = 1 when Q does not flips any
auxiliary qubit, and vanishes otherwise. The Pauli operators that do not flip auxiliary qubits can be written as Q′ ⊗Q′′
whereQ′ ∈ Pm andQ′′ ∈ {I, Z}⊗d. It follows that the number of such operator is exactly 4m2d. Omitting the identity
In we are left with 4m2d − 1 operators which are undetected by our scheme. We return to Eq. 21:
. . . ≥ s+ (1− s) (1 − 4
m2d − 1
4n − 1 ) (22)
≥ s+ (1− s) (1 − 4
m2d
4m+d
) (23)
= 1− 1− s
2d
(24)
The security follows from the fact that s ≥ 0, and hence the projection is bounded by 1− 12d .

We remark that the above proof in fact implies a stronger theorem: interventions that are very close to I are even
more likely to keep the state in the space defined by P |ψ〉1 .
What remains to prove is Claim B.1 which is stated above. To this end we need three simple lemmata:
Lemma B.2 Fix a non-identity Pauli operator. Applying a random Clifford operator (by conjugation) maps it to a Pauli
operator chosen uniformly over all non-identity Pauli operators. More formally, for every P,Q ∈ Pn \ {I} it holds
that :
∣∣{C ∈ Cn|C†PC = Q}∣∣ = |Cn||Pn|−1 = |Cn|4n−1 .
Lemma B.3 Let P 6= P ′ be Pauli operators. For any ρ it holds that: ∑C∈Cn C†PCρC†P ′C = 0.
Lemma B.4 Let U =
∑
P∈Pn
P ⊗ UP be a unitary operator. For any density matrix ρ:∑
P∈Pn
Tr(UPρU †P ) = 1 (25)
Assuming these lemmata we are ready to prove the claim:
Proof of Claim B.1: Let U =
∑
P∈Pn
P ⊗UP be the operator applied by Eve. We denote ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0¯〉 〈0¯| the
state of Alice prior to encoding. Let us now write the state of Bob’s system after decoding and before measuring the d
auxiliary qubits. For clarity of reading we omit the normalization factor |Cn| and denote the Clifford operation applied
by Alice (Bob) C (C†):
ρBob = TrE
( ∑
C∈Cn
(C ⊗ IE)†U
(
(C ⊗ IE)ρ(C ⊗ IE)† ⊗ ρE
)
U †(C ⊗ IE)
)
(26)
= TrE
( ∑
P,P ′∈Pn
∑
C∈Cn
(C ⊗ IE)†P ⊗ UP
(
(C ⊗ IE)ρ(C ⊗ IE)† ⊗ ρE
)
P ′ ⊗ U †P ′(C ⊗ IE)
)
(27)
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Regrouping elements operating on M and on E we have:
. . . = TrE
( ∑
P,P ′∈Pn
∑
C∈Cn
(
C†PCρC†P ′C
)⊗ UPρEU †P ′)
=
∑
P,P ′∈Pn
∑
C∈Cn
(
C†PCρC†P ′C
) · Tr(UPρEU †P ′) (28)
We use Lemma B.3 and are left only with P = P ′
. . . =
∑
P∈Pn
∑
C∈Cn
(
C†PCρC†PC
) · Tr(UPρEU †P ′) (29)
We first consider the case were P = I, then: ∑
C∈Cn
C†PCρC†PC = |Cn|ρ (30)
On the other hand when, P 6= I by Lemma B.2:
∑
C∈Cn
C†PCρC†PC =
∑
Q∈P\{I}
QρQ†
|Cn|
|Pn| − 1 (31)
Plugging the above two equations in Eq. 29:
. . . = |Cn|ρTr
(
UIρEU
†
I
)
+
∑
P∈Pn\{I}
∑
Q∈Pn\{I}
(
QρQ†
) |Cn|
|Pn| − 1Tr
(
UP ρEU
†
P ′
)
= |Cn|ρTr
(
UIρEU
†
I
)
+
|Cn|
∑
P 6=I Tr
(
UPρEU
†
P
)
|Pn| − 1
∑
Q∈Pn\{I}
(
QρQ†
) (32)
We use Lemma B.4 and so Bob’s state after renormalization can be written as:
sρ+
(1 − s)
4n − 1
∑
Q∈Pn\{I}
(
QρQ†
) (33)
For s = Tr(UIρU †I), which concludes the proof. 
Finally, we prove the lemmata stated above:
Proof of Lemma B.2: We first claim that or every Q,P ∈ Pn \ I there exists D ∈ Cn such that D†PD = Q. We
will prove this claim by induction. Specifically, we show that starting form any non identity Pauli operator one can,
using conjunction by Clifford group operator reach the Pauli operator X ⊗ I⊗n−1.
We first notice that the swap operation is in C2 since it holds that:
SWAPk,k+1 = CNOTk→(k+1)CNOT(k+1)→kCNOTk→(k+1) (34)
Furthermore, we recall that K†(XZ)K ∝ X and H†ZH = X . Therefore, any Pauli P = P1⊗. . .⊗Pn can be
transformed using SWAP,H and K to the form: X⊗k ⊗ I⊗n−k (up to a phase). To conclude we use:
CNOT †1→2(X1 ⊗X2)CNOT1→2 = X ⊗ I (35)
which reduces the number ofX operations at hand. Applying this sufficiently many times results in reaching the desired
form. Since this holds for any non-identity Pauli operators: P,Q we know there are C,D ∈ Cn such that:
X ⊗ I⊗n−1 = C†PC = D†QD (36)
⇒ DC†PCD† = Q (37)
therefore CD† is the operator we looked for. We return to the proof of the Lemma, let us first fix some Q 6= I, it will
suffice to prove that for any P, P ′ the set AP,P ′
def
=
{
C ∈ Cn|C†PC = P ′
}
is of a fixed size. We set D ∈ Cn such that
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D†PD = Q then it holds that: CD ∈ AQ,P ′ ⇐⇒ C ∈ AP,P ′ therefore |AP,P ′ | = |AQ,P ′ |, and |AQ′,P ′ | = |AQ,P |
follows trivially.
We use the fact that the sets {AP,Q : ∀P} is a partition of Cn, and that all AP,Q have the same size:
|Cn| =
∑
P ′∈Pn\I
|AP ′,Q| = (4n − 1) |AP,Q| (38)
Which concludes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma B.3: Since P 6= P ′ we know there exists an index i such that Pi 6= P ′i that is:
Pi = X
aZb P ′i = X
a′Zb
′ (39)
where (a, b) 6= (a′, b′). let us define Qi = X1−b−b
′
i Z
1−a−a′
i ⊗I. We notice that (Qi⊗I)C ∈ Cn and furthermore any
operator in Cn can be written in this form. We write QiC instead of (Qi ⊗ I)C for simplicity.∑
C∈Cn
C†PCρC†P ′C =
∑
QiC∈Cn
(QiC)
†
P (QiC) ρ (QiC)
†
P ′ (QiC) (40)
=
∑
QiC∈Cn
C†Q†iPQiCρC
†Q†iP
′QiC (41)
It is easy to check that Q commutes with either P ′ or P and anti-commutes with the other. Therefore:
. . . = (−1)
∑
QiC∈Cn
C†Q†iQiPCρC
†Q†iQiP
′C (42)
= (−1)
∑
QiC∈Cn
C†PCρC†P ′C (43)
= (−1)
∑
C∈Cn
C†PCρC†P ′C (44)
This concludes the proof since the sum must vanish.

Proof of Lemma B.4: We analyze the action of U on the density matrix I ⊗ τ . We first notice that since U is a trace
preserving operator, that is: Tr(U(I ⊗ τ)U †) = Tr(I ⊗ τ) = 1. On the other hand it holds that:
Tr
(
U(I ⊗ τ)U †) = ∑
P,P ′∈Pn
Tr
(
(P ⊗ UP )(I ⊗ τ)(P ′ ⊗ UP ′)†
) (45)
=
∑
P,P ′∈Pn
Tr
(
PIP ′† ⊗ UP τU †P ′
) (46)
=
∑
P,P ′∈Pn
Tr
(
PP ′†
)
Tr
(
UP τU
†
P ′
) (47)
If P 6= P ′ then Tr(PP ′†) = 0, and therefore:
. . . =
∑
P∈Pn
Tr
(I)Tr(UP τU †P )
=
∑
P∈Pn
Tr
(
UP τU
†
P
) (48)
It follows that 1 =
∑
P∈Pn
Tr(UP τU †P ), which concludes the proof.

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B.2 Concatenated Clifford QAS
Proof of Theorem 3.2: From Claim B.1, we know that any attack by Eve on an authenticated register is equivalent
to an effect of the mixing operatorMs, on the unencoded message space. We notice that any attack on the concatenated
protocol is in fact equivalent to separate attacks on the different registers. This fact follows from the fact any individual
attack can be broken down to attacks of the form Ms, specifically for r = 2:
ρBob =
1
|Cn|2
∑
C1,C2∈Cn
(C1 ⊗ C2)†E
(
(C1 ⊗ C2)(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2)(C1 ⊗ C2)†
)
(C1 ⊗ C2)
=
1
|Cn|2
∑
P,Q∈Pn
∑
C1,C2∈Cn
αP,Q(P ⊗Q)(C1 ⊗ C2)(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2)(C1 ⊗ C2)†)(P ⊗Q)†
=
∑
P,Q∈Pn
αP,Q
( 1
|Cn|
∑
C1∈Cn
(C†1PC1ρ1C
†
1P
†C1)
)⊗ ( 1|Cn|
∑
C2∈Cn
(C†2QC2ρ2C
†
2Q
†C2)
)
(49)
We denote Ms(ρ) = ρ˜, and use Lemma B.2: it holds that:
. . . = αI,I(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) + (
∑
P,Q6=I∈Pn
αP,Q)(ρ˜1 ⊗ ρ˜2) + (
∑
P 6=I∈Pn
αP,I)(ρ˜1 ⊗ ρ2) + (
∑
Q6=I∈Pn
αI,Q)(ρ1 ⊗ ρ˜2) (50)
Bob does not abort, if both individual Clifford QAS are valid. From the security of the individual QAS we know that
Tr((P ρi0 )B(ρ˜i)) < 2−d where B is Bob cheat detecting procedure. We also notice that P
ρ1⊗ρ2
0 = P
ρ1
0 ⊗ P ρ20 . We first
rewrite Eq. 50 more clearly:
. . . = s(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) + h(ρ˜1 ⊗ ρ2) + r(ρ1 ⊗ ρ˜2) + t(ρ˜1 ⊗ ρ˜2) (51)
and using the above observations we have:
Tr
(
P ρ1⊗ρ20 B (s(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) + h(ρ˜1 ⊗ ρ2) + r(ρ1 ⊗ ρ˜2) + t(ρ˜1 ⊗ ρ˜2))
)
= s · 0 + q · 2−d + r · 2−d + t · 2−d · 2−d
≤(1− a)2−d
(52)
Where the inequality holds since s+ q + r + t = 1.
The claim for r > 2 is follows the exact same lines and therefore is omitted.

C Polynomial Authentication Scheme
C.1 Security Proof of Polynomial QAS
C.1.1 Security Against Pauli Attacks
Lemma C.1 The polynomial QAS is secure against (generalized) Pauli attacks, that is, in the case where the adversary
applies a Pauli operator. In this case the projection of Bob’s state on the space spanned by P1 |ψ〉 is at least 1− 2−d.
Proof: Let us consider the effect of a Pauli Q operator on the signed polynomial code Ck. We first show that with
probability 1− 2−d over the sign key k, the effect of Q is detected by the error detection procedure.
Let Qx 6= I be a Pauli operator Qx = Xxi⊗. . .⊗Xxm where x ∈ Fmq . The effect of Qx on the code is an addition
of xi to the i′th qubit. This addition passes the error detection step only if coincides with the values of a signed
polynomial of degree at most d. We consider two cases depending on the weight of x:
• If |x| ≤ d: let us denote by g the polynomial that satisfies ∀ikig(αi) = xi, since Qx 6= I we know that g 6= 0.
then g has at least m− d zeros. Since g is nonzero it must have degree at of least: m− d = d+1. Such an attack
will be detected with certainty by the error detection procedure.
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• Otherwise, assume without loss of generality that xi 6= 0 for i ≤ |x|. There is exactly one polynomial f of degree
at most d such that ∀i≥d+1 kif(αi) = xi. For the attack of Eve to be undetected x must agree with f on the
remaining coordinates as well:
Pr
k
(∀i≤d xi = kif(αi)) =
d∏
i=1
Pr
k
(ki = x
−1
i f(αi)) (53)
Equality holds since: ki are independent, ki = k−1i and xi 6= 0 for i ≤ d. Since ki = c with probability at most
half we conclude that the probability that Eve’s attack is undetected is at most 2−d.
Now that we have proved the claim for operators of the form Qx, we handle the general case. Pauli Z are mapped in
the dual code to X operators. Since the signed polynomial code is self dual, Qz attacks will be caught with probability
1− 2−d as well. To conclude the proof we notice that detection Qx attacks do not depend on the existence Qz attacks,
therefore, a non identity operator Qx,z = PzPx will be detected with the correct probability since either x or z must be
non trivial.
What remains is to notice that the Pauli randomizationPx,z simply shifts any attack Q on the authenticated message
to a different Pauli. That is the effect on the signed polynomial code is P †x,zQPx,z. We conclude that any Pauli operator
acting on the polynomial QAS is detected with a probability of at least 1− 2−d as claimed. 
C.1.2 Security Against General Attacks
We start with a generalization of Lemma B.3 for generalized Pauli operators.
Lemma C.2 Let P 6= P ′ generalized Pauli operators. Then: ∑Q∈Pm Q†PQρQ†P ′†Q = 0
The proof follows the same line as Lemma B.3:
Proof of Lemma C.2: Let P 6= P ′ be generalized Pauli operator P = XaZb and P ′ = Xa′Zb′ .
∑
Q∈Pm
Q†PQρQ†P ′†Q =
q−1∑
d,c=0
(XcZd)†XaZb(XcZd)ρ(XcZd)†(Xa
′
Zb
′
)†(XcZd) (54)
We use the fact that ZdXc = ωdcq XcZd and some algebra:
. . . =
q−1∑
d,c=0
ωd(a−a
′)+c(b−b′)
q X
aZbρZ−b
′
X−a
′ (55)
= XaZbρZ−b
′
X−a
′
q−1∑
c=0
ωc(b−b
′)
q
q−1∑
d=0
ωd(a−a
′)
q (56)
To conclude the proof we recall that a 6= a′ or b 6= b′, hence one of the above sums vanishes.

In addition we need one more simple lemma:
Lemma C.3 For any generalized Pauli operator P
1
|Pm|
∑
Q∈Pm
Q†PQρQ†P †Q = PρP † (57)
Proof of Lemma C.3: From the observation about generalized Pauli operators in Sec. 2 we know that for any two
generalized Pauli operators P,Q PQ = αQP where α is some phase dependent on P and Q.
1
|Pm|
∑
Q∈Pm
Q†PQρQ†P †Q =
1
|Pm|
∑
Q∈Pm
Q†(αQP )ρ(α∗P †Q†)Q
=
1
|Pm|
∑
Q∈Pm
αPρα∗P †
= PρP †
(58)
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Proof of Theorem 3.3: The proof will follow the same lines as Theorem 3.1. For clarity, we omit the normalization
factor |Pm|. We start by decomposing any attack V ∈ U(M ⊗ E) made by Eve to V =
∑
P∈Pm
P ⊗ UP . Bob’s state
prior to applying the error detection procedure is:
ρBob = TrE
( ∑
Q∈Pm
(Q⊗ IE)†V
(
(Q⊗ IE)ρ⊗ ρE(Q⊗ IE)†
)
V †(Q⊗ IE)
)
(59)
= TrE
( ∑
P,P ′∈Pm
∑
Q∈Pm
(Q⊗ IE)†P ⊗ UP
(
(Q⊗ IE)ρ⊗ ρE(Q⊗ IE)†
)
P ′ ⊗ U †P ′(Q⊗ IE)
)
(60)
Regrouping elements operating on M and on E we have:
. . . =TrE
( ∑
P,P ′∈Pm
∑
Q∈Pm
(
Q†PQρQ†P ′Q
)⊗ UPρEU †P ′)
=
∑
P,P ′∈Pm
∑
Q∈Pm
Tr
(
UPρEU
†
P ′
)
· (Q†PQρQ†P ′Q) (61)
We use Lemma C.2 and are left only with P = P ′
. . . =
∑
P∈Pm
∑
Q∈Pm
Tr
(
UPρEU
†
P
)
· (Q†PQρQ†PQ) (62)
Now we use Lemma C.3 :
. . . =
∑
P∈Pm
Tr
(
U †PUPρE
)
· |Pm|PρP † (63)
We set αP = Tr
(
U †PUPρE
)
and we rewrite Bob’s state after normalization:
αI · ρ+
∑
P∈Pm\{I}
αP · PρP † (64)
Recall that we are interested projection of Bob’s state on the subspace spanned by the operator P |ψ〉1 .
Tr
(
P
|ψ〉
1
(
αI · ρ+
∑
P∈Pm\{I}
αP · PρP †
))
= αI +
∑
P∈Pm\{I}
αPTr
(
P
|ψ〉
1 PρP
†
)
(65)
We use the bound from Lemma C.1:
. . . ≥ αI +
∑
P∈Pm\{I}
αP
(
1− 2−d) (66)
= (1− 1− αI
2d
) (67)
Which concludes the proof. Similarly to the random Clifford authentication scheme, the further Eve’s intervention is
closer to the identity, that is – Eve does almost nothing, then the projection on the good subspace is closer to 1. 
C.2 Concatenated Polynomial QAS
When authenticating multiple registers, it may seem at first glance that Eve has the advantage of being able to tamper
with the state by applying some transformation on the entire space. In the concatenated Clifford authentication protocol,
the intervention of Eve is broken down to individual attacks on each register by the fact random Clifford operators are
applied to each register independently.
The main idea for the concatenated polynomial authentication is to use an independent Pauli key (x, z) for each
registers, while maintaining the sign key k equal between registers. This idea will suffice to “brake up” the attack of
Eve to a sequence of attacks on each register separately.
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Protocol C.1 Concatenated polynomial Authentication protocol:
Alice wishes to send a state |ψ〉 ∈ (Cq)⊗r that is r q-dimensional systems. For a security parameter d, set m = 2d+1.
Alice randomly selects a single sign key k ∈ {±1}m, furthermore, Alice selects r independent Pauli keys (xj , zj).
To encode |ψ〉 Alice encodes each q-dimensional system using the signed polynomial code specified by k. Addition-
ally, Alice shifts the j’th encoded message by P(xj ,yj).
Bob decodes each message separately, if all messages are correctly authenticated Bob dealers as valid the concate-
nated message, otherwise Bob aborts.
We now prove Theorem 3.4.
Proof of (: of Theorem 3.4) We notice that all the reasoning in Theorem 3.3 till Eq. 66 hold in this case as well. So
we have that the projection on the good subspace P |ψ〉1 is equal to:
αI +
∑
P∈Pr·m\{I}
αPTr
(
P
|ψ〉
1 PρP
†
)
(68)
We start by writing Tr(P |ψ〉1 PρP †) = 1 − Tr(P |ψ〉0 PρP †). We recall that P here is a Pauli operator from the group
Pm·r so we write: P = P(1)⊗. . .⊗P(r).
Lemma C.4 The probability for Bob to be fooled by the application of P 6= I is at most 2−d.
Proof: For PρP † to be in P |φ〉0 it must be the case that for all j such that P(j) 6= I Eve escapes detection (Bob does not
abort although the register is “corrupted”). We note that Bob declares as valid the remaining registers (where P(j) = I)
with certainty. We assume without loss of generality that P(1) 6= I, we write the probability that Bob is fooled:
Pr (Bob is fooled by P ) = Pr (∀j:P(j) 6=IBob is fooled by P(j)) (69)
≤ Pr (Bob is fooled by P(1)) (70)
≤ 2−d (71)
Where the last inequality holds by Lemma C.1. 
Plugging this result into Eq. 66 we have:
. . . = αI +
∑
P∈Pr·m\{I}
αP
(
1− Tr(P |ψ〉0 PρP †)
)
(72)
≥ αI +
∑
P∈Pr·m\{I}
αP
(
1− 2−d) (73)
=
(
1− 1− αI
2d
)
(74)
Which concludes the proof. 
D Polynomial Authentication Based QPIP
D.1 Secure Application of Quantum Gates
We have seen in Sec. 2.2 how to perform operations on states encoded by a polynomial code. In this section we present
a way for the prover to apply certain operations on a signed shifted Polynomial error correcting code. This can be done
without compromising the security of the authentication scheme.
The main idea is that the transitive operation performed on the signed Polynomial code have almost the desired
effect on the state at hand. The verifier will only need to update his keys (x, z) for the provers action to have the desired
effect on the state.
We will first show the simple and elegant fact that if the verifier wants a (generalized) Pauli applied to the state, he
does not need to ask the prover to do anything. The only thing the verifier must do is change his Pauli keys. Then, we
show how to perform other operations such as SUM, Fourier and Measurement.
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• Pauli X : The logical X˜ operator consists of an application of Xk1⊗, . . . ⊗ Xkm where k is the sign key. We
claim that the change (x, z)→ (x − k, z) will in fact change the interpretation the verifier assigns to the state in
the desired way.
Px,z
∣∣Ska〉 = Px−k,zP †x−k,zPx,z ∣∣Ska〉
= Px−k,zX
−(x−k)Z−zZzXx
∣∣Ska〉
= Px−k,z(X
k1⊗, . . .⊗Xkm)
∣∣Ska〉
= Px−k,zX˜
∣∣Ska〉
(75)
• Pauli Z: Similarly to the X operator, all that is needed is a change of the Pauli key. We recall that Z˜ =
Zr1k1⊗. . .⊗Zrmkm . We define the vector t to be ti = ciki. From the same argument as above, it holds that the
change of keys must be (x, z)→ (x, z − t).
• Controlled-Sum: In order to remotely apply the SUM operation the prover perform transversely Controlled-
Sum (SUM) from register A to register B on the authenticated states; as if the code was not shifted by the Pauli
masking. However, a change in the Pauli keys is needed for the operation to have the desired effect. It is easy to
check that:
SUM(ZzAXxA ⊗ ZzBXxB) = (ZzA−zBXxA ⊗ ZzBXxB+xA)SUM (76)
Which implies that the same hold for the logical operation S˜UM, and the Pauli shift P(x,z) that is:
S˜UM
(
P(xA,zA) ⊗ P(xB ,zB)
)
=
(
P(xA,zA−zB) ⊗ P(xB+xA,zB)
)
S˜UM (77)
Hence, the verifier must change the pair of keys (xA, zA), (xB , zB) to (xA, zA− zB) and (xB + xA, zB), for the
SUM to have the desired affect on the state.
• Fourier: The prover performs Fourier transversely on the authenticated state. We recall that the Fourier operation
swaps the roles of the X and Z Pauli operator. FXxF † = Zx and FZzF † = X−z. This is true for each register
separately and hence:
F˜ · Zz1Xx1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ZzmXxm =X−z1Zx1 ⊗ . . .⊗X−zmZxm · F˜
≃Zx1X−z1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ZxmX−zm · F˜
(78)
Where the last equality is up to a global phase.
Therefore the verifier must change the key (x, z) to (−z, x).
• Measurement in the standard basis: The prover measures the encoded state in the standard basis, send result
to the verifier. Using the x part of Pauli key, and the knowledge of k, the verifier interpolates the polynomial
according to values in the received set of points. If the polynomial is indeed a polynomial of low degree (which
is always the case if the prover is honest) the verifier sends the encoded value to the prover. Otherwise, the prover
is caught cheating and the verifier aborts.
• Toffoli: The (generalized) Toffoli gate is applied using Clifford group operations on the Toffoli state 1q
∑
a,b |a, b, ab〉
([BOCG+06, NCG00]). The application of a Toffoli gate in such a way does not imply a change of keys directly.
Changes are made with respect to the actual operations that were performed.
D.2 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Lemma 4.2 At any stage of the protocol the verifier’s set of keys, k and {(x, z)i}n1 are distributed uniformly and
independently.
Proof of Lemma 4.2: Before any gate is applied the claim holds. All that needs to be done it to check that all
changes keep this desired property.
The sign key k does not change during the protocol so in this case the claim is trivial. At every step at most two pair
of Pauli keys change, let us review the possible changes (see Appendix D.1) and verify that the claim holds:
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• Changes from the Pauli operators and Fourier transform induces shift, swap or negation changes to the keys; all
of them preserve the uniform independent distribution trivially.
• The SUM operation involves two set of keys (xA, zA), (xB , zB) which change to (xA, zA − zB) and (xB +
xA, zB). The sum xB + xA, is mod q hence it is distributed uniformly, in addition it is not hard to see that
is independent of xA. The same holds for zA − zB and zB . Other parts of both keys are trivially distributed
correctly.
• When the prover measures in the standard basis an authenticated qubit the outcome of the measurement is
distributed uniformly at random in Fmq . Specifically, the outcome does not depend on the sign key or the
information that is authenticated. Therefore, even when the prover has the interpretation of his measurement
outcome, he does not gain any information about the sign key k or the Pauli keys of other registers.

E Fault Tolerant QPIP
For the interactive proofs described above to be relevant in a any realistic scenario, dealing with noise is necessary. We
will present a scheme based on the polynomial QPIP, that enables us to conduct interactive proofs in the presence of
noise.
Theorem 1.3 Theorem 1.1 holds also when the quantum communication and computation devices are subjected to
the usual local noise model.
Proof: (Sketch) Our proof is based on a collection of standard fault-tolerant quantum computation techniques. Care
must be given to the fact that the verifier is the only one who can authenticate qubits, while he cannot authenticate many
qubits in parallel.
The proof can be divided into three stages.
In the first stage, the prover receives authenticated qudits from the verifier, one by one. Each qudit is authenticated
on m qudits. The prover ignores the authentication structure and begins encoding each qubit out of the m qubits
separately using a concatenated error correction code, with total length which is polylogarithmic, as is required for the
fault tolerance scheme in [ABO97]. From the work of [ABO97, KLZ98] (and others) we know that this encoding can
be done in a fault tolerant way, such that if the error probability was less than some threshold η, then the encoded qudit
is faulty (namely, has an effective error) with probability at most η′, where η′ is a constant that depends on η and other
parameters of the encoding scheme, but not on n. We denote this concatenated encoding procedure by S¯.
Since each authenticated qudit sent to the prover is encoded using a constant number (m) of qudits, it follows that
with a constant probability, η′′ all these qubits are effectively correctly authenticated. In other words, the encoding of∣∣Ska〉, (S¯⊗. . .⊗S¯) ∣∣Ska〉, has no effective faults with probability η′′.
Once a qudit has been encoded by the prover, he can keep applying error corrections on that qudit, and thus, can
keep its effective error below some constant for a polynomially long time. Polynomially many authenticated qudits are
sent this way to the prover.
In the second stage a purification procedure is performed on the authenticated messages, which are now protected
from noise by the prover’s concatenated error correction code. Since the purification is of the authenticated qudits,
it is done according to instructions from the verifier. As explained in Appendix ?? the verifier can also interpret
measurements outcomes for the prover, which are needed for the purification procedure. We need to purify both input
qubits which are without loss of generality |0〉, and Toffoli states. Any standard purification procedure (for example,
that of [BOCG+06]) would work for the |0〉 states. In order to purify the Toffoli states we use the purification described
in [BOCG+06]. The purification procedure uses polylogarithmically many qubits in order to provide a total error of at
most ∆poly(nT ) , where T is the number of gates in the circuit U that will be computed by the prover. This means (using
the union bound) that with probability at most ∆ all purified states are effectively correct.
Finally, having with high probability, correct input states, the polynomial QPIP (Protocol 4.2) is executed. The
prover applies logical operations (SUM,F and measurements) on his registers which contain authenticated qubits. In
particular, a logical measurement of the output bit of the computation is executed by the prover at the end of the
computation. The result is then sent to the verifier who subsequently interprets it according to his secret key.
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The soundness of the this fault tolerant QPIP is the same as that of the standard QPIP. In fact, in this scheme,
the verifier ignores the prover’s overhead of encoding the input in an error correcting code, and performing encoded
operations. The verifier can be thought as performing Protocol 4.2 for a purification circuit followed by the circuit he is
interested in computing. Therefore, the security proof of Theorem 4.1 proves in fact that applying the purification and
computation circuits, has the same soundness parameter as the standard QPIP.
Regarding completeness, the fact that the prover’s computation is noisy changes the error probability only very
slightly. There is a probability ∆ that one of the input authenticated states is effectively incorrect; Once they are
all correct, the fault tolerance proof implies that they remain correct the entire computation with all but an inverse
polynomial probability. Therefore, if the standard QPIP protocol has completeness 1− δ − ǫ the completeness of this
scheme is bounded by 1− δ − ǫ− 2∆. 
F Blind QPIP
Definition F.1 [AS06, BFK08, Chi01] Secure blind quantum computation is a process where a server computes a
function for a client and the following properties hold:
• Blindness: The prover gets no information beyond an upper bound on the size of the circuit. Formally, in a blind
computation scheme for a set of function Fn the prover’s reduced density matrix is identical for every f ∈ Fn.
• Security: Completeness and soundness hold the same way as in QAS (Definition 3.1).
Theorem 1.4 There is a blind QPIP for Q-CIRCUIT.
We use the QPIP protocols for Q-CIRCUIT in order to provide a blind protocol for any language in BQP. We use
the simple observation that the input is completely hidden from the prover. This holds since in both QAS presented
the density matrix that describes the prover’s state does not depend on the input to the circuit. Specifically, due to the
randomized selection of an authentication, the prover’s state is the completely mixed state. We also use in the proof
of this theorem the notion of a universal circuit. Roughly, a universal circuit acts on input bits and control bits. The
control bits can be thought of, as a description of a circuit that should be applied to the input bits. Constructions of such
universal circuits are left as an easy exercise to the reader.
Having mentioned the above observations, a blind computation protocol is not hard to devise. The verifier will,
regardless of the input, compute, with the prover’s help, the result of the universal circuit acting on input and control
bits.
We first formally define a universal circuit:
Definition F.2 The universal circuit Un,k acts in the following way:
Un,k |φ〉 ⊗ |c(U)〉 −→ U |φ〉 |c(U)〉 (79)
Where c(U) is the canonical (classical) description of the circuit U .
Proof of Theorem 1.4: We prove that both the Clifford based QPIP and the Polynomial QPIP can be used to create
a blind computation protocol. We claim that the state of the prover through the protocols is described by the completely
mixed state. This is true in the Polynomial scheme since the Pauli randomization does exactly that. Averaging over all
possible Pauli keys, it is easy to check that the state of the prover is described by I. Furthermore, the prover gains no
information regarding the Pauli key during the protocol, therefore, the description of the state does not change during
the protocol as claimed.
Since the above holds for any initial state, it follows that the prover has no information about the initial, intermediate
or final state of the system.
To see that the same argument holds for the Clifford QAS, it suffices to notice that applying a random Clifford
operator “includes” the application of a random Pauli:
1
|Cn|
∑
c∈Cn
CρC† =
1
|Cn|
∑
c∈Cn
(CQ)ρ(CQ)† (80)
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Equality holds for any Q ∈ Cn since it is nothing but a change of order of summation.
. . . =
∑
Q∈Pn
1
|Pn|
1
|Cn|
∑
c∈Cn
C(QρQ†)C† (81)
=
1
|Cn|
∑
c∈Cn
1
|Pn|
∑
Q∈Pn
C(QρQ†)C† (82)
=
1
|Cn|
∑
c∈Cn
C
( 1
|Pn|
∑
Q∈Pn
(
QρQ†
) )
C† (83)
=
1
|Cn|
∑
c∈Cn
C (I)C† (84)
= I (85)

G Interpretation of Results
Proof of Corollary1.5: Let us first deal with the Clifford based QPIP. We assume that the soundness of the scheme
is δ and that the prover applies a strategy on which the verifier dose not abort with probability γ. The final state of the
protocol before the verifier’s cheat detection can be written as (see Eq. 33):
sρc +
(1 − s)
4n − 1
∑
Q∈Pn\{I}
(
QρcQ
†
) (86)
Where ρc is the correct final state of the protocol. After the verifier applies the cheat detection procedure B (which
checks that the control registers are indeed in the |0〉 state):
sρc ⊗ |V AL〉 〈V AL|+ αrejρrej ⊗ |ABR〉 〈ABR|+ αbadρbad ⊗ |V AL〉 〈V AL| (87)
Assume the verifier declares the computation valid, then his state is:
sρc + αbadρbad
1− αrej ⊗ |V AL〉 〈V AL| (88)
then the trace distance to the correct state ρc is bounded by:
1− s
1− αrej +
αbad
1− αrej =
2αbad
1− αrej ≤
2δ
γ
(89)
Were the inequality follows from the security of the QPIP protocol: αbad ≤ δ, and the fact that the non-aborting
probability γ is equal to αbad + s.
The proof that the Polynomial based QPIP has the same property follows the exact same lines. 
H Symmetric Definition of QPIP
The definitions and results presented so far seem to be asymmetric. They refer to a setting where the provers wishes
to convince the verifier solely of YES instances (of problems in BQP). This asymmetry does not seem natural neither
regarding the complexity class BQP nor in the cryptographic or commercial aspects. In fact, this intuition is indeed
true.
Apparently, we can provide a symmetric definition of quantum prover interactive proofs, and show that the two
definitions are equivalent. Essentially, this follows from the trivial observation that the class BQP is closed under
complement, that is, L ∈ BQP ⇐⇒ Lc ∈ BQP.
To see this, let us first consider the symmetric definition for QPIP.
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Definition H.1 A language L is in the class symmetric quantum prover interactive proof (QPIPsym) if there exists an
interactive protocol with the following properties:
• The prover and verifier computational power is exactly the same as in the definition of QPIP (Definition 1.1).
Namely, a BQP machine and quantum-classical hybrid machine for the prover and verifier respectively.
• Communication is identical to the QPIP definition.
• The verifier has three possible outcomes: YES, NO, and ABORT:
– YES: The verifier is convinced that x ∈ L.
– NO: The verifier is convinced that x /∈ L.
– ABORT: The verifier caught the prover cheating.
• Completeness: There exists a prover P such that ∀x ∈ {0, 1}∗ the verifier is correct with high probability:
Pr ([V ,P ] (x, r) = 1L) ≥ 2
3
where 1L is the indicator function of L.
• Soundness: For any prover P ′ and for any x ∈ {0, 1}∗, the verifier is mistaken with bounded probability, that is:
Pr ([V ,P ] (x, r) = 1− 1L) ≤ 1
3
Theorem H.1 For any language L: If L,Lc are both in QPIP then L,Lc ∈ QPIPsym
Proof: Let VL,PL denote the QPIP verifier and prover for the language L. By the assumption, there exists such a
pair for both L and Lc. We define the pair P˜ and V˜ to be QPIPsym verifier and prover in the following way: On the
first round the prover P˜ sends to V˜ “yes” if x ∈ L and “no” otherwise. Now, both P˜ and V˜ behave according to
VL,PL if “yes” was sent or according to VLc ,PLc otherwise. Soundness and completeness follows immediately from
the definition.

Since BQP is closed under completion, we get:
Corollary H.2 BQP = QPIPsym
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